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In this paper we show how relatively small changes in the age at marriage can equilibrate
the marriage market despite relatively large differences in the supply of men and women of
marriageable age. In particular, a simple demographic model is developed that provides a
prediction about the relationship between relative cohort size and age at marriage that differs
markedly from that of the static model that has been emphasized in the previous literature. We
illustrate this point empirically using micro-level from a rural area of Bangladesh which
experienced a large increase in age at marriage for women (3.2 years) over the period from 1975
to 1990 at the same time that the relative supply of women in the marriage market was
decreasing. We then estimate a behavioral model characterizing the relative values of men and
women with different characteristics in the marriage market in order to better understand why
female age at marriage served as the primary equilibrating mechanism in this population. The
estimates suggest that the rise in the age at marriage was in part facilitated by a decline in the
extent to which youth was valued by potential grooms and/or their families.1Singh and Samara (1996) summarize these arguments.
2In China, for example, the legal minimum age of marriage for women was increased to 20 in
1980 as part of an effort to lower fertility. Harayana State in India experimented with a program
to provide bonds to low income families at the birth of a daughter that could be redeemed at age
18 only if the girl had not yet married (Singh and Samara 1996)
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I. Introduction
Changes in the age at marriage, particularly for women, have long been thought to be an
important component of the development process. By delaying marriage for women, it is argued,
women may stay in school longer, find more suitable mates, have greater say in the allocation of
household resources, and begin childbearing at a later age which, in turn, may improve outcomes
for children, result in fewer overall births per women, and slow population growth
1 In response
to these concerns policies have been implemented that are designed to delay marriage directly
through regulation and indirectly through fincancial incentives.
2 There is also substantial
concern about potential social implications of an imbalanced number of men and women who
wish to marry at a particular point in time (a “marriage squeeze”) and how this may influence and
be influenced by the age at marriage. An excess supply of women that arises from a large gap in
ages at marriages may increase marital payments from women’s to men’s families (Caldwell,
Reddy and Caldwell 1983, Lindenbaum 1981, Rao 1993) and thus may be a factor in, for
example, excess rates of female mortality. By contrast, there is concern that differential
mortality and sex-selective abortion may lead to a substantial fraction of unmarried men and that
changes in age at marriage can do little to address this imbalance (Tuljapurkar et al 1995).
Despite the apparent importance of age at marriage in relation to other individual and
social measures of well-being, relatively little is understood about the underlying mechanisms of
age at marriage change. While there is a useful theoretical literature on matching in general and3Bergstrom (1999) provides an excellent summary of the relevant literature.
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marriage markets in particular,
3 few theories have been examined empirically. Most studies that
have examined age at marriage are partial-equilibrium in nature and thus miss the important
general-equilibrium effects in the marriage market. Boulier and Rosenzweig (1984) show, for
example, that less attractive women tend to marry later, that increases in schooling tend to
decrease search time, and that longer search and thus later age at marriage, ceteris paribus,
improves the quality of spouses, it is not obvious what these results imply about the effects of
changes in average schooling on average marriage age or how delays in marriage as a whole
affect equilibrium in the marriage market. In contrast to other demographic outcomes, which
primarily involve behaviors of a single household, marriage involves interaction among
households and thus inter-household and market-level relationships are likely to be important.
Unfortunately, few data sets contain sufficient information on potential marriage partners to
examine anything but the simplest forms of interhousehold interaction.
One of the few market-level theories of age at marriage-change that has been subject to
substantial empirical scrutiny involves the relationship between population age distribution and
the marriage squeeze. The basic idea, which obtains in a simple static model, is that the extent of
the marriage squeeze associated with variation in cohort size will be smaller the smaller is the
gap in age at marriage between men and women. In the extreme, given that sex ratios at birth are
close to one, no marriage-squeeze arises at all when the age-gap is zero, regardless of variation in
cohort size. Thus one would expect smaller gaps in age at marriage when the cohorts of women
at peak ages of female marriage are substantially larger than the cohorts of men at peak ages of
male marriage.
Despite the apparent simplicity of the posited relationship, the evidence is only weakly4Note that the theoretical model provided by Berstrom and Lam (1993) is dynamic and could, in
principle, have yielded a test similar to the one developed below; the primary implication they
test, however, is the standard one that arises from a static model.
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supportive, with most studies finding significant but weak relationships of the expected sign and
others finding contradictory results (Smith 1983). Results from time series studies appear to be
in general stronger than those from cross-sectional studies. For example, Bergstrom and Lam
(1993), in an analysis of Swedish data, find that the difference in the ages at marriage between
men and women responds to the relative number of men and women eligible for marriage as
predicted by this static model.
4 Edlund (1999), however, using cross-sectional aggregate data
from Asia uncovers only a weak relationship between sex-ratios and the spousal age gap.
In this paper we argue that the standard prediction of the cross-sectional model can be
misleading because it does not account for key dynamic aspects of the process of marriage-
market equilibration through changes in the age at marriage. In particular, a simple demographic
model is used to show that the relevant relationship is not between relative cohort size and the
amount of the age gap, but between relative cohort size and the rate of change in the age gap. We
illustrate this point empirically using micro-level data from a rural area of Bangladesh which
experienced a marked increase in age at marriage for women (3.2 years) over the period from
1975 to 1990 at the same time that the relative supply of women in the marriage market was not
decreasing. We show that this result, which is at odds with the predictions of the static model,
conforms well with the predictions of the alternative model. We then estimate a behavioral
model characterizing the relative values of men and women with different characteristics in the
marriage market in order to better understand why female age at marriage served as the primary
equilibrating mechanism in this population. The estimates suggest that the rise in the age at
marriage was in part facilitated by a decline in the extent to which youth was valued by potential5Note that Nm(x) is the marital analog to the net maternity schedule: it is the product of the
probability of marriage at age x among survivors and the probability of surviving to age x. It also
permits more than one marriage for each individual. The reason for examining this schedule
rather than the more traditional first-marriage hazard is the need to keep track of all marriages in
the economy including, for example, second marriages of men to first marriages of women.
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grooms and/or their families.
II. Demographic Model
The starting point for our analysis is a model of equilibrium that incorporates the idea of
demographic translation, which is a tool used by demographers to relate cohort and period
summary measures of age-specific demographic data (Ryder 1964, Foster 1990). Its most
prominent application, to date, is in the context of the US baby boom where it was recognized
that the substantial increases in average rates of childbearing during the 1950s (period fertility)
were not matched by corresponding increases in completed family size (cohort fertility) by
women in the peak childbearing averages during these years. Demographic translation was used
to show that this discrepancy could be largely accounted for by the fact that there was a
substantial drop across cohorts in the average age at childbearing so that previous cohorts who
had delayed their fertility were giving birth at the same time as subsequent cohorts with earlier
childbearing (Ryder 1964).
In the current context demographic translation is used to convert cohort and sex-specific
measures of cohort size in combination with the timing and rate of marriage into period-specific
counts of the number of men and women wishing to marry at each point in time. Thus, let
Nm(x,T) denote the proportion of males born in year T who marry at age x (inclusive of
remarriage),
5 and let Nm(T) denote the number of males in cohort T. Further, let cm(T) = (Nm(T)-
N)/N denote variation in cohort size relative to the average cohort ,which is assumed to be of size
N. Then by integrating across all cohorts alive at time t scaled by the appropriate age-specific6In the field of demography this is known as a model schedule. Demographic model schedules
take advantage of the substantial regularity in age patterns of demographic rates and are primarily
used to construct age-specific vital rates using incomplete data. For example, in a one-parameter
model information on child mortality might be used to predict the whole age-pattern of mortality
in a given population. Formally, a k-parameter demographic model schedule is a mapping
N:[0,T]xU
kYU that yields for each parameter value a predicted vital rate at each age. The
particular schedule created here is a simplification of that developed in Foster (1990).
7The choice of a standardized schedule is, of course, somewhat arbitrary but one reasonable




marriage rate we may write the number of males marrying at period t as:
where T is the maximum age in the population. A similar expression represents the number of
w o m e nm a r r y i n gi np e r i o dt ,M f(t), with each subscript m replaced with an f. Marriage-market
equilibrium requires at each point in time.
We then parameterize the cohort-specific marriage rate schedule . We rely on a
two-parameter model
6 which related the marriage rate schedule in a particular cohort T to the
age-pattern of marriage in an average or standard population,
7 The two parameters of the
model, gm(T) and am(T), as illustrated below, characterize the overall frequency of marriage for
cohort T and the age-distribution or timing of marriage, respectively, and are written as functions
of T to emphasize the fact that the parameters will, in general, differ by cohort. In particular, the
cohort-specific rate of marriage for someone of age x in cohort T is modeled:
We also assume that the standard schedule is continuous and differentiable in x, that8This is essentially a technical requirement but is plausible: net marriage rates are essentially zero
in early child and at extreme ages, with the latter following in particular because these rates are
gross of survival as noted in footnote 2.
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there is a minimum " and maximum $ age of marriage such that for x<" and x>$ and
that cohort variation in timing is sufficiently small that "-am(T)>0 and $+am(T)<T for all
cohorts.
8
Figures 1 and 2 show the effects of variation in the model parameters gk(T) and ak(T) on
net marriage rates for men and women. Figure 1 presents the effects of changes in the level
parameter gk(T) for men (k=m) and women (k=f) respectively using as a standard the average
age-patterns of marriage from the rural Bangladeshi population that will be the subject of our
analysis below. The standard male and females schedules are the black dashed and dotted lines,
respectively, which correspond to the model schedules evaluated at gm(T)=am(T)=0 and
gf(T)=af(T)=0, respectively. The dark and light grey dashed line represents the model schedule
evaluated at gm(T)=.2 and gm(T)=-.2, respectively, and so forth. It is evident from Figure 1 that
female age at marriage is earlier and more concentrated than is male age at marriage and that an
increase in g from 0 to .2 results in a proportionate increase in net marriage rates. Figure 2 shows
that a change from 0 to 2 in each of the timing parameters shifts the respective marriage
schedules to the right by two years.
Because it shifts up the marriage schedule at each age, the cohort-specific parameter




marriages per male born in a cohort experiencing the standard marriage schedule is
then the total number of marriages per male for cohort T, Gm(T), is
Thus gm(T) measures deviations in the average number of marriages per male cohort member
relative to the average number of marriages by men in a cohort experiencing the rates of the
standard schedule.
Similarly, if the mean age at marriage of the standard population is
then the mean age at marriage for cohort T,8
(6)
(7)
Thus am(T) measures deviations in the average age at marriage for men in cohort T from the
average age at marriage for a cohort experiencing the rates given by the standard male schedule.
If variation in the three cohort-specific measures cm(T), am(T), and gm(T) is small then
substantial insight into process of equilibration in the marriage may be obtained by carrying out a
linear approximation to the supply of males in these measures, and similarly for women. In
particular, relative deviations in the number males marrying may be
written:
which indicates that higher marriage rates and cohort sizes increase the number of males
marrying. Assuming, in addition, that am(T) is differentiable, a more interpretable expression
may be obtained by integrating by parts
This expression indicates, for example, that decreases in cohort size and overall marriage rates
that decrease the number of men marrying at a particular point in time will be offset by decreases
in the age at marriage for men. Intuitively, if the age at marriage for men is dropping over time
then younger men are entering the marriage market at the same time as their (infinitesimally)
older counterparts thus expanding the supply of men to the marriage market at each point in time.
While it has been pointed out that changes in the timing of marriage can play an important role in
equilibrating the marriage market (Bergstrom and Lam 1993), the simplicity of the relationship
has not, to our knowledge been illustrated elsewhere.9In particular, we assume that where * is Dirac’s delta. While it may appear
that (9) can be obtained directly from (8), this is not precisely true since (8) was derived based on
the assumption that the standard schedule is differentiable. The actual derivation is
somewhat technical without providing additional insight and is thus omitted. It is available from




A key feature of this relationship is that it is between the level of cohort size, on the one
hand, and the change in the age at marriage: if the number of men marrying in a given year is to
be kept constant, then it must be the case that a temporary increase in cohort size will result in a
permanent increase in the age at marriage for men. These relationships may be illustrated by
assuming that the standardized marriage schedule is highly concentrated with a peak at some age
Ams.
9 Thus, to first order, the age at marriage for cohort T is , and (7) reduces
to
Assuming further that there is no change in the level of marriage (gm(.)=gf(.)=0), we may equate
the number of men and women marrying at each time t and substitute (8), to get
where )A=Ams-Afs and t*=t-Afs. Thus if the time derivative of the difference in the ages at
marriage (males minus females) equals the negative of the excess fraction of females in
corresponding marriage cohorts, the marriage market will remain in equilibrium: a 10% surplus
of females may be accommodated through a .1 year decline in the age at marriage difference (e.g,
through a .1 year increase in the age at marriage for females assuming )A>0).




source of change in the proportion marrying. In the presence of differences in the age at marriage,
rapid population growth will tend to create an imbalance between the number of men and women
wishing to marry at a particular point in time because, typically, older males from small cohorts
are being matched with women from more recent and therefore larger cohorts. Suppose then, that
the rate of population growth has been fixed at r for a long period and that, for simplicity, the
male age at marriage is fixed at Ams. The extent of the imbalance is given to first order by the
expression
Substitution of (9) yields the differential equation.
Thus the marriage market can be equilibrated if the female age at marriage is rising at the rate
rate r)A. Thus, for example, in a population with a growth rate of .025 and an age difference in
spouses of 8 years, the female age at marriage would only need to rise by .2 years per year to
keep the market in equilibrium. Moreover, as the age-gap narrows the difference in cohort size
will fall as well, reducing the magnitude of these effects. Thus, solving (11), yields
so that the magnitudes of the age at marriage change required to equilibrate the market will decay
exponentially. Thus, for the marriage market to stay in equilibrium in the presence of population
growth of this magnitude and an initial age gap of 8 years, one requires only that the age gap fall
to 6.23 years over a decade and to 4.85 years over two decades. Arguably these changes are small10The assumption of a roughly even sex-ratio at a given age is relevant here. If the sex-ratio were
skewed due to sex selective abortion rather than population growth, a reasonable approximation
to the current situation in China (Tuljapurkar et al 1995), then the rate of change in the female
age at marriage necessary to equilibrate the marriage market would not diminish with the age
gap. Nonetheless the effects would not be substantially different over this time frame: a fixed
20% excess number of males in each cohort would result over two decades in a decrease in the
age gap from 8 to 4 rather than 4.85 years. It is worth noting that Tuljapurkar et al’s (1995)
conclusion that the changes in marriage patterns could not be used to equilibrate the marriage
market was based on a comparison of three different fixed marriage patterns and thus did not
allow for kind of dynamic adjustment that the analysis presented here suggests is critical.
11




In order to test the ability of this simple model to explain patterns of marriage change we
need annual age-specific marriage rates by sex for a reasonably large number of years. While in
principle any aggregate data set with accurate reported ages can be used for this purpose, it seems
of particular value to examine a country for which the conditions appear to be conducive to the
presence of a wide gap in the relative numbers of men and women in the marriage market.
Moreover, in order to distinguish marriage-squeeze effects from other changes that might alter
the age distribution of marriage it is helpful to have micro-level data so that a structural model of
marriage-market allocation may be estimated.
Vital registration data from the records of the Demographic Surveillance System (DSS) of
the International Centre for Diarrhoeal Disease Research in Bangladesh (ICDDRB) are thus
particularly well suited to this analysis. This is an area which has a large gap in age at marriage,
as is evident in Figures 1 and 2, and which has undergone substantial population growth over the
relevant period yielding a substantial gap between the number of men and women at peak ages at
marriage. The population consists of 164,000 people (as of 1974) in 149 spatially contiguous11Over the 1974-1982 period there are a number of instances in which of marriages are reported
twice within a two-year period for the same individuals. These records likely reflect (1) cases in
which marriage records were available from both the husband's and the wife's households but
were reported in somewhat different time periods (2) some cases in which marriage was never
actually consummated (as a result, for example, of the failure of one party to meet their terms of
the dowries) and an individual married someone else. In these cases we chose the latter of the
two records. There also appears to be a fair amount of divorce (10% of marriages) within two
years of the time at marriage, although it is not clear whether these represent consummated
marriages or not. In the present study we include these marriages..
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villages in Matlab Upazilla, which is a rural riverine area. Individual-level, longitudinally
collected birth, death and migration registration data are available for all residents of the villages
starting in 1966, and all marriage information is available after 1975. Censuses were carried out
in 1974 and 1982 and these provide information on household structure, education, and resource
availability. All records can be linked at the individual level using permanent individual ID
numbers. This not only augments the richness of the data but makes for more accurate age
reporting. In particular, ages reported on the marriage certificate have been reconciled with
earlier information on age from the censuses.
Marriage records are filed for anyone living in the study area at the time of marriage
(whether or not they remain within the area after marriage). These records contain information on
education, age and occupation of both spouses. In this study we make use of the marriage records
between 1975 and 1990. During this period there were 49,734 unique marriage records
reported.
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A key issue that has arisen in much of the literature examining the marriage-squeeze and
its potential effects on age marriage is the need to define the marriage market appropriately. If
the marriage market is defined too broadly, for example, and there is substantial local variation in
the relative availability of men and women then marriage-timing may appear to be little affected
by variation in cohort size even if, at the local level, this effect is quite important at the local13
level. The presence of detailed vital registration data in a geographically contiguous area
provides a particular opportunity to address these issues.
The evidence suggests that it is reasonable to use pre-migration cohort sizes from the
study area to characterize the marriage market. First, while there is substantial marriage within
villages, the marriage market is clearly broader than the village. In particular, 25.2% of the
marriage records villages
In particular, we find that of the 49,734 total marriages over the 16-year period for which
at least one spouse was from the study area, 22,754 (45.75%) of husbands and 31,138 (62.6%) of
wives were from the study area. The difference between these two area reflects the process of
migration. If there were two equal areas, only one of which contains vital registration data, then
given patrilocal residence (married couples typically live in the same village if not the same
household as the husband's parents (see, e.g., Foster 1992)), the number of women marrying a
husband outside of the study area, in the absence of substatantial geographic variation in the sex-
ratio of marriageable men and women, should equal the number of women from outside
marrying inside and thus the fractions of men and women from outside conditional on marriage
should be the same. The reason for the discrepancy here is that migration for men typically
occurs before marriage, while migration for women occurs at the time of marriage. If the man
migrates before marriage and the woman at marriage, only the woman would be recorded as
coming from the study area at the time of marriage.
IV. Evidence on age adjustment
Table 1 presents results on the mean ages at marriage, based on the marriage-registration
data, between 1975 and 1990 as well as the difference in the ages at marriage for spouses.
Marriage ages for women in the mid 1970s were extremely low and rose by 3.2 years over the12Bergstrom and Bagnoli (1993) provides an explanation of this pervasive phenomenon.
13Emigration by age for men and women are not very different in this population: there are
approximately the same number of men and women living in the study area at each point in time.
Migration plays an important in determining the availability of marriage partners in Matlab
because men typically migrate before the peak ages at marriage while women frequently migrate
at the time of marriage. As a result, the reported figures effectively overstates the availability of
men in the country as a whole.
14Note that these quantities do not reflect the changes in the age at marriage (except through the
relationship between marriage and migration), because the age ranges are being held fixed.
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subsequent 15 year period. As is evident in Figure 1, the mean age at marriage for men is
considerably higher
12: among marriages in 1975, the average age difference between spouses was
10.1 years. Moreover because the male age at marriage only rose by 1.1 years over the study
period, the difference in spouses ages declined to 7.7 years in 1990. Indeed, since the male age at
marriage barely changed at all until after 1987, the mean age difference for spouses in that year
was only 5.92 years.
We turn now to the question of how well these changes in ages at marriage relate to the
sizes of the marriage-age population as posited by the standard static model. An overall measure
of the relative supply of men and women in each year is constructed using, as peak ages at
marriage for men and women, 24-27 and 16-19, respectively. It is evident from the last column
of Table 1 that there was a substantial surplus of women during the early part of the study period
of almost 75%. This figure reflects the differential in the age at marriage in the population, the
rapid population growth, declines in mortality in the early 1960s, and the emigration from the
area of young men.
13 More importantly, the extent of the surplus diminishes over time reaching
8.1% in 1987, which also happens to be the year in which the mean age difference is at a
minimum.
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As is clearly evident from Table 1, the relationship between the relative size of cohorts15
and the age gap is opposite of what would have been predicted based on the standard static
model: a lower excess supply of women is associated with a smaller age gap. The regression line
has a slope of .031 and is clearly positive and significant (t=5.65).
The resolution is in equation (8). As noted above, the formal demographic model shows
that markets can be equilibrated if the time derivative in the age at marriage difference (male age
minus female age) is positively related to the surplus of men of the appropriate age (or negatively
related to the surplus of women). Thus, it is the fact that there is a surplus of women in each year
that is potentially related to the rise in the age at marriage for women, not the fact that the extent
of the surplus diminished over time. One should expect on this basis that the time derivative of
the age at marriage difference should be negative but rising towards zero over time as the surplus
of women is reduced somewhat. This prediction is borne out by the fact that the difference in the
age at marriage begins to rise just after the surplus female proportion falls below 10%.
To test explicitly the relationship between the surplus proportion of women and the time
derivative of the age at marriage difference, it is necessary to translate the period information on
marriages into information on the marriage rates of different cohorts, consistent with the formal
demographic model discussed above. The difficulty with this approach is that data over a 15 year
period provides incomplete information with which to construct estimates of the level and age-
profile of marriage of cohorts over the relevant interval. Thus following Foster (1990), we make
use of regression methods to extract from the data over the relevant interval information on the
timing and level of cohort marriage rates.
We first constructed marriage rates by age and cohort conditional on being in the study
population at the age of 13 (the effective minimum marriage age) using the data from the 1975-
1990 period. The numerator in each case is the number of marriages by sex of age x individuals15For cohorts that reached the age of 13 before the 1974 census we used the sex-specific counts
of individuals at the time of that census because previous censuses had somewhat different
coverage than the 1974 census and linkage is more difficult. For these cohorts net marriage rates
will be somewhat higher and net cohort sizes somewhat lower than would be obtained if cohort
sizes at age 13 had been available.
16This may be thought of as the first step in iterative non-linear least-squares estimation of (2).
Use of a single iteration seemed sensible in that the basic predictions being examined rely
themselves on a linear approximation. In practice, subsequent iterations did not substantially alter
parameter values in any case.
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(13)
in that period who are currently resident in the study area and the denominator is the number of
individuals of that sex in the corresponding cohort at age 13.
15 These rates were then averaged
across cohorts and smoothed using the lowess procedure to obtain a sex-specific standard
schedule . The lowess procedure also yields estimates of the first derivative of the standard
schedule with respect to age at each age. The smoothed standard rates are plotted, as noted, in
Figures 1 and 2. For sex k we then estimate a linear approximation to equation (2) in the cohort
parameters around gk(T)=ak(T)=0:
where ekxT captures approximation error, by regressing, for each cohort and for the age available
for that cohort, the actual cohort rates on the sex-specific smoothed schedule and its first
derivative with respect to age. This yields estimates of1+gk(T)and ak(T), respectively, as is
evident from (13).
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The estimates of ak(T) and gk(T) for men and women of corresponding cohorts (i.e.,
separated by 8 years, the average age difference between spouses) are presented in Table 2. The
range of cohorts for which estimates are provided is determined by the fact that precise estimates
of the level and timing of fertility for a particular cohort can only be obtained using this17This measure is different from that presented in Table 1 in that it reflects the relative sizes of
the corresponding cohorts of men and women at the peak ages at marriage.
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regression method if the period marriage data are available at ages for which the levels of
marriage for that cohort are reasonably high. Because women born before 1960 were over the age
of 15 over the entire study period while those born after 1973 were under the age of 17 over the
entire period, only cohorts of women born in the years 1960-1973 were included in the analysis.
Men were included if they were born 8 years earlier than the corresponding cohort of women (ie.,
1952-1965).
The estimates for the timing of marriage for men and women correspond roughly to what
was observed for the period data: the cohort mean age at marriage for women rises over the
interval at an average rate of .139 years per year, although the largest changes are observed for
the cohorts 62-65. Although there is a fair amount of change in the male age at marriage there is
little in the way of a trend. In addition the extent of marriage relative to cohort size at age 13 has
declined considerably for both men and women, a fact that likely reflects outmigration from the
study area rather than a change in the proportion ever marrying or the number of marriages per
individual. Although this effect is somewhat stronger for men than women, implying that
migration may have worsened the deficit of young men in the study area, the fact that it changes
similarly for both limits the importance of this effect with regard to the relative supply of men
and women in the marriage market. The final two columns present estimates of the relative
surplus of women by cohort
17 and of the time derivative of the difference in age at marriage
where the latter is calculated for each cohort T by subtracting the age at marriage difference for
cohort T+1 from the age at marriage difference for cohort T: (am(T+1)-af(T+1))-(am(T)-af(T)).
The key question is, what is the relationship is between the time derivative of the age at18The fit suggests that key assumptions used to derive (10) are not unreasonable. Of particular
importance are the assumption that the market clears at the local level, that cohort data can be
well approximated by a two parameter model, and that variation in parameters is sufficiently
small that a linear approximation is appropriate. .
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marriage difference and the relative surplus of women by cohort size? In addition to being
presented in Table 2 these measures are graphed in Figure 3. The relationship is extremely strong
and negative as suggested: the time derivative of the cohort age at marriage difference in the age
at marriage is negatively related to the relative surplus of women (slope=-1.69, t=8.17). The fact
that this coefficient exceeds in absolute value the slope that would be expected based on
equation (10), -1, may be at least partially attributed to the fact that the level parameter is also
changing: a regression that includes differences in marriage probabilities (gm(T)-gf(T)) yields a
coefficient on cohort size of -1.36 that is not significantly different from one. (P=.52).
While it is perhaps not altogether surprising that the data correspond closely to the
prediction of the demographic model,
18 the results are nonetheless informative. Faced with a
surplus of women of marriageable women for a given schedule the market may respond in
several different ways. There may be changes in proportion of individuals marrying, or perhaps
increased migration for marriage, or a change in the dispersion of marriage. The fact that the data
corresponds so closely to this simple model is at least consistent with the idea that delays in the
timing of the marriage are primarily the result of the marriage squeeze. Moreover, it is
informative to look at how the difference in the age at marriage narrowed: as is evident from
equation (10), this narrowing could occur either through earlier marriage by men or through later
marriage by women. While these results cannot tell us exactly why later ages at marriage were
primarily responsible, they do show that the response of the women was dominant.
V. Behavioral Model19In their approach the public good is the time of marriage which is directly observable. In ours




To gain some insight into the behaviors that underlie the patterns observed in Tables 1
and 2, it is helpful to know how potential spouses are valued in the marriage market. In effect
what is needed is a price that reflects how different attributes are rewarded at each point in time.
One approach to this problem is to make use of information on dowries as in Rao (1993).
Unfortunately, detailed information on dowries is not available in these data. In any case, given
the complexity of marital transactions it is unclear whether dowries fully measure differences in
the value of potential spouses: intrahousehold allocations and post-marriage interhousehold
transfers (Rosenzweig and Stark 1989) may substitute for the payment of dowries. Thus we need
a method for constructing implicit measure of the value of different potential spouses.
In order to construct such an estimate we consider a simple economic model. In
particular, we make use of transferable utility with private consumption goods for each spouse
and a public (within marriage) good which is an adaptation of the model used by Bergstrom and
Lam (1993) to simulate age at marriage change using aggregate Swedish data.
19 As noted by
Bergstrom and Lam (1993), this model exhibits two convenient properties: (i) the level of public
good consumption within each marriage is not influenced by distributional considerations and
(Ii) any pareto efficient allocation in the marriage market maximizes the sum of total utility.
In particular we assume that the utility of a married male i may be written
where c is the private consumption good, h is the consumption of the public good, and hm is a20We assume, for simplicity, that the ideal level of child human capital varies only by sex.
Relaxing this assumption would change the interpretation of the estimated coefficients but would
not alter the proposed estimation or the resulting implications for the relative value of different




parameter that represents the unconstrained optimum consumption of the public good.
20 Utility is
increasing in private consumption and decreasing in the distance between the actual and ideal
level of consumption of the public good. A similar utility functions holds for females with the
subscript m replaced with an f.
We assume further that the public good is only produced at home and that the cost of
producing the good is linear and decreasing in the human capital (broadly construed) of the
husband rmi and wife rfi respectively. For concreteness it is helpful to think of the public good as
being child human capital, in which case what is being assumed here is that the cost of producing
a given level of human capital for a child will be lower if that child's parents have higher levels
of human capital themselves. Thus the budget constraint that arises when male i marries female j
is:
where ci and cj are the parents' respective level of private consumption, hij is the level of public
good selected, ymi and yfj are the parents' respective levels of earnings, and is the
price of child services.
Under these conditions any efficient allocation given the attributes of i and j has the




and that the sum of utilities of the man and woman in the couple is
where zm() and zf() are quadratic functions and ,ij is an added match-specific shock that may be
thought of as “chemistry”. The third term in equation (17) says simply that, ceteris paribus, joint
utility will be higher if a high human capital male is married to a high human capital female.
As noted, a key implication of the transferable utility function is that, under these
conditions, the marriage market will operate in a way that maximizes the total amount of marital
utility given the individuals who choose to marry at a particular date (Bergstrom 1997). The basic
idea is that distributions within marriage do not affect which marriages take place because the
distributional issues can be dealt with through a reallocation of private consumption. The fact
that total welfare is maximized overall implies that given any two couples within this marriage
market that the total welfare of these four individuals could not have been improved by a swap of
their respective spouses. In particular, for males i and k and females j and l, with i married to j
and k married to l,
which requires
Note that the functions zm() and zf() in (17) drop out of (19) because they appear linearly in Z and
depend only on the characteristics of individuals, not of couples. Also, the fact that the male and
female attribute equations appear in this expression in differences implies that time-specific21The number of items code has generally been found to be a relatively effective measure of
socio-economic conditions in this population. The code is the sum of indicator variables
indicating whether the household owns a radio, a watch, a hurricane lamp, a traditional quilt, and
whether it receives remittances. This measure thus has a maximum of 5 and a mean in 1974 of
2.8. Unfortunately information on land ownership was not collected in the 1974 census.
22
(20)
unobservables that are shared by all those marrying in a particular year (including those related to
the selection into marriage in that period) will be differenced out.
We assume that the parental human capital variables are linear functions of observables
individual characteristics that may influence parental productivity in the provision of child
human capital with the coefficients differing by sex: and , for men and
women, respectively, where $m and $f are coefficient vectors and xmi and xfi are vectors of
characteristics. We also assume that the match specific shock ,ij is distributed such that the sum
,ij+,kl has an extreme value distribution. Let Iijkl be an indicator which takes the value 1 if i
marries j and k marries l. Then
which suggests that the parameter estimates may be obtained using a non-linear conditional logit
procedure.
The vector of characteristics included in x are, for each individual, the number of items
owned by the household,
21 education, head's education, age and age squared. A normalization is
also necessary: doubling the coefficients on hm and halving the coefficients on hf would not
change the likelihood. Thus, we set the coefficient on the male items code to one. Under the
assumption that an increase in the number of items owned by the male's household makes him
more attractive in the marriage market, we may thus interpret the other estimated coefficients as22Note that in the spirit of our model, "attractiveness in the marriage market" refers to the extent
of human capital of an individual, and operates only through the effects of human capital on the
cost of the provision of the public good. There is nothing in the model that would imply that
there should be assortative mating according to, for example, income y(x) other than to the extent
that h(x) and y(x) are closely associated with each other (as we might expect to be the case in
practice). Indeed, given hf(x), a potential groom will be indifferent to marrying women with
different yf(x) because the extra resources of a higher income wife will be transferred away in the
form of a dowry or though greater consumption by the wife.
23Preliminary estimates that distinguished between primary and less-than-primary schooling for
the women indicated that having more than 5 years of schooling yielded a very large effect;
however, given the fact that very few women in the early period were educated beyond the
primary level, these estimates proved to be quite unstable when stratified by period and thus we
have chosen to condition only on having some education.
23
measures of the extent to which a given attribute raises an individual's attractiveness in the
marriage market.
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The resulting coefficient estimates are presented in Table 3. In each column the
coefficients on the wife's attributes are presented (i.e., the estimates of $f), followed by the
coefficients for the husband's attributes, $m). At the bottom of the table, the estimates of the most
preferred age at marriage for each sex (computed based on the quadratic age effects) are also
presented.
The first column pools the sample over the 1975-1990 period. The estimates appear quite
sensible: women from households with more items owned, with a more educated head, and who
are themselves more educated all are apparently more attractive in the marriage market than
those from poorer households with lower levels of schooling. Education proved to be quite
important: the value of having a secondary educated head is roughly comparable to the value of
having 2.3 additional items. The education of the woman appears to be at least as important as
the education of her father: a woman with no schooling and a father with more than primary
schooling would be as preferred as one with some schooling and an uneducated father.
2324Foster and Roy (1999) discuss the decreases in fertility and increases in educational investment
in the Matlab population over the relevant period. Behrman, Foster, Rosenzweig and Vashistha
(1999) and Foster and Rosenzweig (2000) show that increases in the returns to male human
capital increase the demand for educated mothers as an input in the production of high human
capital children. Thus decreases in fertility may, through a quality-quantity tradeoff, increase the
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Evidently the degree of preference for women of a particular age is not very strong: the
coefficients on age indicate a deviation of plus or minus five from the preferred age at marriage
is equivalent to only a .3 drop in the number of items.
The results for husbands are broadly similar. In this case it is clear that the characteristics
of the spouse are much more important than the characteristics of head: a spouse with some
primary education from a head with no education is preferred to a spouse with no education from
a household where the head has completed primary education. Relative to the number of items
owned in the household (recall that the coefficient on items for the husband has been normalized
to one) the effects of some primary education for the husband (2.01) are slightly less than the
effects observed for a woman with some education (2.16). Finally, the costs of not marrying at a
particular age are roughly the same for men as for women: a five year deviation from the
preferred age at marriage is equivalent to a .43 drop in the number of items.
Given the rapid change in the age at marriage over time, it is instructive to ask whether
there was a change in how women and men were evaluated in the marriage market over time. It
has been suggested (Caldwell et al. 1983, Lindenbaum 1981) that a rise in the value of husband's
education from the perspective of potential brides (or their families) may have played an
important role in the rise in education as well as a shift from bride prices to dowries. Also,
consistent with the spirit of our model, an increased interest in providing children with schooling
in the area may have increased the desirability of having a mature and educated wife compared
with the value of having a wife from a good household.
24importance given to schooling in the marriage market. To the extent that increases in age may
improve maternal quality this same mechanism might also increase the optimal age of brides.
25It is worth pointing out that in this model dowries play no role in the determination of who
marries whom: they simply reflect the allocations of resources given marriage. In a less
restrictive model, older women may appear to be more attractive marriage partners because they
come with larger dowries, which may themselves reflect a greater willingness of parents to pay to
marry off their older daughters out of concern that the daughters may soon become too old to
marry. But this seems at odds with the fact that the relative surplus of women is falling as the
most attractive age at marriage rises.
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A comparison between columns two and three indicates that any changes were quite
moderate. There is a small rise in the extent to which the education of women was valued,
particularly compared with the extent to which the education of the head in her household was
valued, which is consistent with the idea that the characteristics of the women became more
valued then the characteristics of her household. There is little change in the relative value of
education of husbands, however.
The most dramatic changes occur with respect to the extent to which individuals of
different ages were valued. In particular, the preferred age at marriage for men rose from 24.3 to
29.6 years while the preferred age at marriage for women rose from 15.7 to 19.6 years. Thus, the
desired age at marriage shifted sharply upward for members of both sexes. Given the scarcity of
the number of older unmarried men 25-30, relative to unmarried women 16-20, this shift in
preferences likely had a relatively pronounced effect on the opportunities open to older,
unmarried women, thus allowing age at marriage to equilibrate the market. Put another way, if
preferences had remained the same, then women who delayed marriage in the 1970s because of
the adverse circumstances vis a vis the availability of potential spouses would at least have had to
accept less attractive marriage partners if they had married at all. The fact that the preferred age
at marriage shifted implies that these women did reasonably well in the marriage market.
2526
VII. Conclusion
In this paper we have undertaken an examination of a rapid rise in the female age at
marriage in a rural area of Bangladesh. The results suggests that the primary mechanism
underlying this change in the age at marriage in that population was the relative scarcity of men
of marriageable age in the population rather than any fundamental change in economic or social
conditions. The model also explains why the increase in the age at marriage of women observed
in Matlab in the 1975-90 period corresponded to a period in which the magnitude of the surplus
of women actually decreased, a result that seems to be at odds with most of the discussion of the
relationship between cohort size and the age at marriage gap in the literature.
In the course of our analysis we have used a simple demographic model to show that,
consistent with what was observed in the study population, the marriage market can easily
accommodate changes in cohort size. We have also obtained estimates of the attractiveness of
different potential spouses in the context of an economic model of marriage that emphasizes the
role played by the attributes of one's partner in the provision of a household-level public good.
The estimates suggest that individuals in this population do not have especially strong
preferences with respect to the age of their spouse at marriage and that the preferred age of a
spouse at marriage increased for both sexes over the relevant period. To the extent that these
results generalize to south Asia as whole, one may question the role of a marriage squeeze in the
transition from bride price to dowry in parts of south Asia. If there are not strong preferences
with respect to age at marriage and if preferences over time have shifted to higher desired ages
then marriage-market payments might be expected to be relatively unresponsive to the relative
numbers of men and women at peak marriage ages. More generally, the results suggest that
concerns expressed in the literature over the adverse consequences of imbalances in the sex ratio27
at peak ages at marriage and the inability of the marriage market to adjust to these conditions
through changes in the age at marriage have been overstated.28
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Period Mean Ages at Marriage and Numbers
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75 16.8 26.9 10.1 3504 6081 1.735
76 16.9 25.9 9.02 3555 6325 1.779
77 17.3 26.2 8.87 3766 6753 1.793
78 17.4 26 8.65 4064 6753 1.662
79 17.6 26.1 8.42 4122 6776 1.644
80 17.8 26.4 8.51 4418 7138 1.616
81 17.9 26.1 8.12 5167 7177 1.389
82 18.3 26.1 7.79 5681 7903 1.391
83 19.2 27.4 8.2 6264 8318 1.328
84 19.4 27.3 7.94 6659 7542 1.133
85 19.6 27.1 7.46 6549 7308 1.116
86 20.2 26.4 6.08 6738 7062 1.048
87 20.2 26.6 5.92 6532 7061 1.081
88 20 27.7 7.71 6373 7145 1.121
89 20.1 27.9 7.8 6103 7358 1.206
90 20.3 28 7.7 6041 7292 1.207Table 2
Estimates of Cohort Timing and Level Parameters for Male and Female Births Cohorts

















af(T)) Women Men Women Men
60 52 -0.853 0.841 0.304 0.621 1.754 -0.938
61 53 -1.03 -0.274 0.263 0.661 1.745 -0.892
62 54 -0.954 -1.09 0.216 0.653 1.698 -0.619
63 55 -0.675 -1.43 0.209 0.576 1.612 -0.431
64 56 -0.354 -1.54 0.161 0.541 1.508 -0.489
65 57 -0.025 -1.7 0.089 0.416 1.391 -0.422
66 58 0.227 -1.87 0.014 0.259 1.288 -0.04
67 59 0.357 -1.78 0.011 0.039 1.198 0.352
68 60 0.365 -1.42 -0.011 -0.084 1.134 0.532
69 61 0.323 -0.93 -0.037 -0.151 1.103 0.395
70 62 0.452 -0.406 -0.1 -0.168 1.091 0.136
71 63 0.639 -0.083 -0.16 -0.197 1.111 0.009
72 64 0.679 -0.034 -0.212 -0.244 1.106 0.07
















Nonlinear Logit Estimates of Marriage Market Valuations
a























































































Wife 17.09 16.85 22.72









aCoefficient on the number of items in husband's household
normalized to one.
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Effects on Ratio of Women to Men on Time






















Male Std. gm=.2 gm=-.2
Female Std. gf=.2 gf=-.2
Figure 1






















Male Std. am=2 am=-2
Female Std. af=-2 af=2
Figure 2
Effects of changes in the timing parameter on predicted marriage rates